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Introduction
1 A group of Internet bloggers recently identified a young (bearded) man from Srinagar: a
gesticulating  demonstrator  with  eyes  blazing,  shouting  frenzied  slogans  against  the
‘Danish  cartoons’,  the  Pope’s  salvo  on  Islam,  Israeli  repression  in  Palestine,  and the
granting of a knighthood to Salman Rushdie, etc.1 ‘Spotting the Islamic Rage Boy’ is now a
blogging pastime, and mocking the ‘fanatic other’ a merchandising enterprise.2 Yet no
one knows why he feels so strongly about such diverse ‘Islamic causes’, nor ‘what moral
visions inspire [his] outrage about often-distant practice and institutions’ (Jasper 1997: 5).
No one even knows his name. Based on interviews with some of the protestors who took
to the streets against the ‘Danish cartoons’ on 14th February 2006 in Lahore, this article is
an attempt to unveil the selfhood of this emblematic figure of an outraged protestor, and
to take his emotions seriously.
2 Academics  have  long  considered  emotions  devoid  of  any  explanatory  power  in  our
understanding of  social  protests  (Goodwin et  al. 2004:  413).  Trained in  the Weberian
tradition that ‘it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectually determined elements of
behaviour  as  factors  of deviation  from  a  conceptually  pure  type  of  rational  action’
(Weber 1978: 6), they have somehow ‘managed to ignore the swirl of passions all around
them in political  life’  (Goodwin et  al. 2001:  1).  But  movements’  opponents know that
public ‘passions’ can hardly be ignored: political leaders spend a great deal of time in
convincing that they are manipulated, 3 while challengers try hard to present them as
nothing else than sheer opportunism (as proven by the stigmatised ‘Rage boy’).
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3 Although emotions alone cannot tell us why an individual joins a protest, they do have an
explanatory  power.  First,  and  as  tautological  as  it  might  seem,  no  organisation  can
mobilize potential protestors if these were not initially affected and moved, or ‘emotionally
disturbed’ (as one the participant to the Lahore’s demonstration put it). Second, emotions
are ‘a  way of  being-in-the-world,  a  relationship between oneself  and one’s  situation’
(Solomon 1984: 250); as such, they shape how disturbing events are specified and how an
opponent’s intentions are qualified. Third, through their public performance, emotions
can have ‘significant  structural  and action consequences’  (Flam & King 2005:  4):  the
anti-‘Danish cartoons’ riot in Lahore did not erupt in a vacuum but in the context of a
(not carefully) staged drama of righteous anger and protestors themselves reclaimed the
right to be politically angry.
4 This particular protest is interesting for several reasons. First,  the military-controlled
government lifted its previously imposed ban on all outdoor meetings for this occasion.
Second, the protest was organized not by the usual ‘Islamist suspects’  but by a small
Barelwi group4, the Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat Mahaz (‘Front for the Protection of the
Honour  of  Muhammad’s  Prophecy’,  or  TNRM).  Third,  it turned  into  a  riot,  a  rare
phenomenon in Lahore. Fourth, the riot was mainly provoked not by a lumpenproletariat
marauding  mob  but  young  middle-class  men,  college  students,  and  street  boys.  The
localization of  the riot  was even more intriguing given that,  two days later,  another
Barelwi group organized a peaceful demonstration in Karachi, a city much better known
than Lahore for its urban violence.
5 Lahore is the second-largest city in Pakistan - with a population of about 7 million people
at the time of the protest - and is the political,  cultural,  and economic centre of the
Punjab province (60% of the population). Contrary to Karachi, it is not ethnically divided:
85% of its population is Punjabi-speaking and 94% is Muslim. It is also a Pakistan Muslim
League (PML) stronghold: a party then divided between the ruling pro-Musharraf faction
(PML-Q) and that led by the exiled former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif (PML-N). The city
has often been the nucleus of anti-government movements:  the anti-Ahmadi5 riots in
1953  (Pakistan’s  first  experience  with  martial  law),  the  1968/69  movement  against
General Ayub Khan that led to his being ousted from power, and the 1977 nizam-i-mustafa 
(‘system of the Prophet’) movement that resulted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s downfall.
6 The anti-‘Danish cartoons’ riot in Lahore did not bring any major political change and
General Musharraf stayed in power for another two years. Yet it offers an interesting
micropolitical site for analyzing how the culture of dissent has evolved in contemporary
Pakistan and how emotions operate in this process:
From the microlevel  processes by which bystanders become participants,  to the
emotional repertoires that activists draw upon when pitching their case in different
settings, to the organizational mechanisms through which particular emotions are
managed, to the macrostructural  shifts responsible for making certain emotions
legitimate motivations for protest (Goodwin et al. 2004: 414).
7 This research map can usefully be applied to the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest in Lahore.
At the micro-level, emotions such as anger and love, linked to specific moral judgment
(honour) and cognitive appraisal (Muslims are being tested by a worldwide conspiracy),
eventually motivated protestors to react. Yet, only emotional repertoires, embedded in
individual biographies, can explain how this inclination translated into effective action:
the  activist  career  of  the  procession’s  chief  organizer,  a  Barelwi  alim,  offers  here  a
fascinating example. At the macro-level, during the protest itself, the emotions displayed
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proved hard to manage and a riot broke out. They were indeed highly conflicting: a desire
for eternal communitas yet destructive anger, an expression of compulsory and morally
valued feelings yet of outlawed emotions. Based on the testimony of a rioter, I argue that
this was informed by the inner conflicts and emotional warfare at work within the crowd.
8 This testimony also reveals how significant are historically shaped local imaginaires of
outrage. This leads me to address the wider emotional-institutional landscape that in
Pakistan  makes  certain  emotions  (such  as  anger  against  perceived  blasphemy)  and
symbolic causes wherein Muslim-ness is at stake ‘legitimate motivations for protest’. The
state’s politics of emotion, largely neglected by the literature on emotions and social
movements  (probably  so  as  a  reaction  to  the  structuralist  models  that  previously
dominated  the  field),  is  impossible  to  ignore  when  studying  patterns  of  dissent  in
Pakistan.
 
The mechanism of the ‘Danish cartoons’ outrage
9 Let us first examine how the ‘mechanism’ or ‘dispositif’ of the outrage over the Danish
‘cartoons’  evolved. A demonstration against this prototypical form of ‘outrage’  that a
blasphemy is needs certain key prerequisites to set it in motion (Favret-Saada 1992: 257):
(i) an institutional setting or pre-existing repertoire of virtual interpretations and public
sanctions (the existence of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan in this case), (ii) a person or
body  to  denounce  the  ‘outrage’  (here,  the  organisations  that  called  for  the
demonstration),  (iii)  a  referent  who  is  denounced  as  having  ‘outraged’  (the  Danish
cartoonists), and (iv) a given authority called to intervene (the Pakistani government).
10 One missing piece also has to be taken into account: outrage often operates as a mirror
process. The very idea of drawing the ‘cartoons’ resulted from a sense of indignation.
Incensed by what it perceived as the growing self-censorship of European artists and
writers when publicly talking about Islam in a post-9/11 context, the editorial team of the
Danish  daily  newspaper  Morgenavisen  Jyllands-Posten decided  to  conduct  an  ‘in  vivo’
experiment by inviting cartoonists to draw the Prophet of Islam ‘as they saw him’. Among
the twelve ‘cartoons’ that were published on 30 September 2005, three, clearly depicting
the Prophet Muhammad,6 provoked an international wave of protest.
11 The  ‘Danish  cartoons’  controversy  has  another  interesting  characteristics:  it  was  an
instance  of  long-distance  outrage,  and  transmitters  proved  critically  important  in
‘exporting’ and framing it in such a way that would echo elsewhere. A Denmark-based 
imam7 played this role: he compiled a file in Arabic containing all the ‘cartoons’, including
more outrageous ones that were never printed,8 and toured the Middle East.  Protests
erupted  first  in  Gaza  and  spiralled  in  February  across  Syria,  Lebanon,  Afghanistan,
Somalia, Iran, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan, resulting in about 140 deaths. The media
played a crucial part in trans-nationalising the issue. Indeed, the object of outrage was
invisible in most Muslim countries where the ‘cartoons’ had been banned (as in Pakistan).
12 Events interestingly followed a script similar to that of the ‘Rushdie affair’ eight years
earlier (Blom 1999): protests started in the denouncers’ regions of origin, small Europe-
based Islamic organisations competed for a monopoly over representing Islam, and they 
internationalised  the  issue  after  they  had  failed  to  succeed  locally.  Sympathetic
governments (Iran in 1989 and Egypt in 2006) took the lead to divert attention from
uneasy domestic situations. In similar fashion, the controversy turned into a worldwide
discursive war opposing abstract conceptual pairs: freedom of expression vs. religious
The 2006 Anti-‘Danish Cartoons’ Riot in Lahore: Outrage and the Emotional Lan...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
3
feelings,  humour  vs. insult,  tolerance  vs.  fundamentalism,  enlightenment  vs.
obscurantism.
13 This is how we were propelled into what Fethi Benslama (2006: 110) rightly calls the age
of ‘global outrage (…) characterized by the disqualification of everything by everyone’ on
a worldwide scale. Yet, he is wrong in assuming that ‘Muslim masses marched at the call
of the emotional plague of humiliation launched by Quranic lunatics’ (Benslama 2006:
111).  Islamic  activism and collective  mobilization for  ‘Muslim causes’  continue to  be
detrimentally perceived as too idiosyncratic, and grounded in too distinctive a mentality
and social milieu, to be addressed as a social movement that can be approached with the
same analytical tools as employed for contentious politics in North America or Europe.
This  resistance  prevents  us  from  understanding  that  they  actually  ‘transcend  the
specificity  of  ‘Islam’  as  a  system of  meaning,  identity,  and basis  of  collective action’
(Wiktorowicz 2004: 3).
14 It  also prevents us from seeing their routinised yet ‘artful’—to borrow James Jasper’s
metaphor (1997)—repertoires of collective action. After the ‘cartoons’ were republished
in  February  2008,  for  instance,  Lahori  drivers  discovered  a  large  rather  frightening,
anonymous, signboard that stated: ‘We Peacefully Condemn Blasphemy. Checklist for a
Journey  to  Hell:  War,  Drugs,  Danish  Products’  and  ended  with  the  unconsciously
unfortunate line ‘Have a Safe Journey!’. Two days later, an anonymous text message was
being randomly circulated: ‘at least 17 Denmark newspapers have insulted prophet again
(…) can we use our freedom of expression to announce to at least 10 persons that we love
our prophet more than our own life? can u pass this to 10 others?’. In addition to the
stated intention of borrowing from the ‘West’s’ moral position (blasphemy equals war and
drugs, and expressing one’s love for the Prophet equals freedom of expression), these
unusual  ways  of  voicing  discontent  also  demonstrated  how powerful  and  functional
emotions can be in mobilizing support.
 
Some words on the methodology
15 In addition to my personal observation of the Lahore demonstration, as well as press
articles  and  TV programmes,  my  primary  material  includes  interviews  with  eight
protestors (all male, no women participated in the protest). These were undertaken in
May 2007, conducted in Urdu, often as an open discussion and sometime with the people
who put me in touch with them. Post-hoc interviews certainly have their limitations: they
artificially  isolate  protestors,  while  a  street  protest  is  first  and foremost  a  collective
event. Nonetheless, a subjective reconstruction of one’s reasons to join a protest does not
mean that only ‘biographical illusions’ come to the surface. Interviews do allow us to
‘identify, in an inductive way, some types of argumentation, some typical agencements,
some specific configurations of categories’ (Dubar quoted in Fillieule 2001: 205).
16 Informal  and  acquaintances’  networks  helped  greatly  in  getting  in  touch  with
interviewees.  Identifying  protestors  a  year  later  proved  slightly  problematic,  the
exception  being  the  protest’s  chief  organizer  and  leader  of  the  TNRM,  maulana
Muhammad Sarfaraz  Naeemi.  In  his  late  50s,  he  is  a  prominent  alim in  the  Barelwi
tradition and heads the Dar-ul Uloom Jamia Naeemia, a remarkably colourful Barelwi
madrasa located in Garhi Shahu, a working-class district nearby Lahore Railway Station.
The  interview  was  conducted  on  its  premises  where  Naeemi  receives  unannounced
visitors all morning.9
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17 While  the  interviewees  came  from  diverse  professional  backgrounds,  ideological
preferences, and levels of participation, they all lived in Lahore’s popular districts and
belonged to the same social milieu, one that can be called—for lack of a better word - the
middle-class, a ‘residual category’ of neither poor nor affluent (Daechsel 2004: 30). All of
them were sons of low-rank civil servants, apart from Waqas, a 22-year-old ‘street boy’
from the Old City (androon sheher) who took part in the riot,10 and Ahmad, a 39-year-old
former boxer, born in the Old City as well. A PPP ‘socialist activist’ in his youth, Ahmad is
now  a  small  cadre  of  the  Pakistan  Tehreek-i-Insaf.  He  went  to  the  14th February
demonstration, somewhat reluctantly, to assert his party’s presence.
18 Nadeem, aged 23, went to the protest alone and ‘shouted slogans’,  but left ‘when the
atmosphere became violent’. He had only participated in a demonstration once against
the privatisation of his college.  Born in a small  Punjabi  town and to an Ahl-i-Hadith
family, he came to Lahore to study law at the Punjab University. He said to dislike the
‘religious  parties’  although he  shared  their  views.  This  was  not  the  case  of  Farhan, 
described by his friend as a ‘typical inflexible Jamaati guy, very committed to the Islamic
cause’. On the otherwise bare walls of his bachelor flat hangs a poster on which is printed
maulana Mawdudi (the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, JI)’s famous speech.11 Aged 31, he
also migrated from a Punjabi village to study history at the Punjab University. He is a
former  member  of  the  JI’s  student  wing,  the  Islami  Jamia-i-Tuleba  (IJT),  and  an
experienced protestor. He ‘keep[s] on going to demonstrations, anti-America ones, for the
Taleban  or  against  the  war  in  Iraq’.  He  also  briefly  attended  a  training  camp  in
Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. His friend Ramzan, a 27-year-old maths teacher, who had
studied at a Deobandi madrasa, joined us and briefly described his participation in the
demonstration.
19 Born in Lahore,  Hasnan is  a 17-year-old student at  the Mohammedan Anglo Oriental
(MAO) College located on the Lower Mall where the riot happened. His favourite pastime
is naat khawani (reciting religious hymns in praise of the Prophet) and watching religious
channels. He is a regular devotee at a Barelwi mosque in the popular Chauburji district in
front  of  which  he  leaves.  The  interview  was  conducted  on  its  premises  and  in  the
presence of its khatib, Qari Tausif. Tausif, a 35-year-old Azad Kashmiri, graduated from
one of the biggest Barelwi madrasas in Lahore’s Old City and is a worker of the Jamiat-ul
Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP, a Barelwi political party formed in 1948). He has participated in
many demonstrations under its banner. A portrait of Ahmed Shah Noorani, its recently
deceased leader,  hangs on the wall of the hujrah (a mosque’s room where the prayer
leader resides), above a cable-connected TV that the imam keeps to remain ‘informed on
current affairs’.
 
The protestors: From righteous anger to biographies
20 ‘People trust the media and no Muslims want to see these cartoons or feel the need for
proof of what they were showing in reality’, states Nadeem. Only two demonstrators I
interviewed had actually seen the ‘cartoons’, the others had to rely on the consensual way
in  which  the  local  media,  English-  and  Urdu-speaking  alike,  framed  the  issue:  the
‘blasphemous  ‘cartoons’  against  Prophet  Muhammad,  PBUH’.  ‘It  was  something  that
disturbed me emotionally’ says Farhan, while Waqas recalls that he ‘got angry as soon as
[he] heard on TV that they had been rude to our Holy Prophet’. This was the emotional
trigger of an outrage, that could not be seen but was strongly felt.
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 Anger, love, and honour
21 ‘Our cognitive beliefs about how the world is, our moral vision of how the world should
be, and our emotional attachment to that world march in close step’ (Jasper 1997: 108) in
informing our motivation to protest to an event we dislike. If no one comes first, it is
precisely  because  emotions  themselves  encompass  this  inter-functionality:  they  are
‘embodied thoughts (…) seeped with the apprehension that ‘I am involved’ (Rosaldo 1984:
143). Yet, emotions are not just constructed, calculated, or ‘managed’ by entrepreneurs
and participants alike (Cefaï 2007: 518).
22 Analyzing  affects,  at  their  pre-reflexive  level,  is  certainly  the  hardest  task  in
understanding their role in collective actions. It is none the less justified, as proven by
Hasnan’s testimony. After stating that, ‘I learnt on TV that some people made caricatures
of the Prophet’,  he immediately put his right hand on his heart and adds:  ‘May God
forgive me but they say they were caricatures [stressing the word] (…) this provoked a big
commotion in Islam and among its people. It’s obvious that in our hearts, a great shock
arose’.  Emotions  indeed also  ‘affirm what  they assert’:  an appraisal  grounded in the
reality of the body itself (Lynch 1990: 14). As a matter of fact, the emotion that the young
protestor tries to describe is a shock related to fear (halchal,  ‘commotion’, also means
‘panic’  in  Urdu,  and  haul,  ‘shock’,  expresses  a  sentiment  of  terror).  Even  more
significantly, this shock is, later on in the interview, compared to ‘a lightening bolt that
struck the heart of those who love the Prophet’.
23 ‘Look, out of respect, we keep no pictures of the Prophet in our houses or even our minds,
how can we possibly allow others to do it?’ explains Ahmad angrily.12 This and, more
precisely,  the  mocking  intent  of  the  ‘cartoons’,  inform  what  has  been  convincingly
defined as ‘the essential political emotion’ (Holmes 2004: 123): anger. ‘These caricatures
were made on the basis of making fun’ adds Hasnan, ‘Thank Allah, I  didn’t see them
because I don’t know what could have happened (…) I would have lost it!’ For Sarfaraz
Naeemi, ridiculing the Prophet was even more infuriating given that ‘these caricatures
were  published  after  a  contest,  they  offered  hundred  thousands  of  dollars  to  the
cartoonists, gave them a guideline and then selected twelve’. Reprinting the drawings in
the European press  added insult  to  injury:  ‘Even after  Muslims protested in a  lot  of
countries  and  told  them  not  to  do  this,  they  reprinted  the  cartoons  several  times’
(Nadeem).
24 The feeling of  anger  is  born out  of  what  was  certainly  the most  ‘managed emotion’
(Hochschild  1983)  during the  mobilization phase  and the protest  event:  love  for  the
Prophet  (ishq-e-rasul).  This certainly does not renderthe  sincerity  of  its  experience
and the protestors’ religious fervour into secondary motivations.Farhan explains this love
as a reflex emotion: ‘Muslims keep on being killed all over the world and we stay quiet.
But love for the Prophet [pause] is such that we cannot bear anything ridiculing it. There
is nothing to be explained, it’s not a scientific thing or a contract. It’s not that kind of
relation: it’s a relation of love’. All protestors mentioned it, irrespective of their doctrinal
affiliation, or almost agnostic position (the PTI activist). For maulana Naeemi, ‘Our faith is
not complete unless we don’t make ishq-e-rasul a part of it’, while for Hasnan, it is ‘the
most important quality of a Muslim’. That ‘Europe’ could not understand its intensity
puzzled the interviewees and informed their perception that a conspiracy was at work
(see below). The fact that the Danish newspaper addressed its apology to ‘Muslims’, and
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not to the ‘Prophet’ was equally baffling. ‘The problem is not us but the personality they
made cartoons of’, says Farhan, ‘suppose I abuse and hurt someone and later say I am
sorry but I still maintain that what I’ve done was my right: what kind of apology is that?’
25 The apology was understood as not only negating the very meaning of the protestors’
love but also as reasserting a moral right to ‘abuse’: far from appeasing protestors, it
increased their anger. Yet anger is not just a feeling, it is ‘a judgmental emotion’: when
being angry, ‘you are the judge, and the other person the defendant’ (Solomon 1984: 250).
This  explains  why  ‘talking  emotions’  was,  during  the  interviews,  constantly  tied  to
communicating,  and  evaluating,  one  another’s  moral  values.  The  publication  of  the
‘cartoons’ provoked, indeed, what James Jasper terms a ‘moral shock’, creating ‘such a
sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined towards political action, with or
without the network of personal contacts’ (Jasper 1997: 106). Interestingly, he compares it
with an electrical shock, a significant reminder of Hasnan’s description of his emotional
indignation.
26 This raises two questions. First, what was the texture of the outrage? The answer is not
easy, as stressed in the introduction to this special issue. Outrage is first and foremost an
act of language, a qualification with a performative dimension. But the word ‘outrage’
does not exist as such in Urdu (the closest is mushta’il, ‘to be enraged’ after a provocation,
or gham-o-ghuse,  ‘sorrow and anger’).  As a matter of  fact,  interviewees used different
words to qualify the ‘cartoons’: a ‘blasphemy (tohin)’ but also ‘a faith problem’ (iman ka
masla)’, a ‘disgrace (behurmati) to the Prophet’s honour (izzat)’, ‘insolence/rudeness (gusta
khi)’ or ‘an insult (be-izzati)’. Sometimes only periphrases, such as this ‘wrongdoing (ghalti
)’ or ‘unsuitable action (nazeba harkat)’. It was often referred to, in terms of its intentions,
as ‘a conspiracy’ (sazish)’ or something ‘aimed at humiliating Islam (Islam ko nicha dikhana
)’. Finally, it was qualified by its effect: it could not be ‘tolerated (bardasht)’, was highly
‘disturbing (taklifdeh)’ and ‘harmed emotions (jazbat ko majru)’.
27 Second, how does a ‘moral shock’ lead to effective mobilization? Certainly, ‘moral shock,
agency, and activism have a complex relation’ (Goodwin et al. 2001: 17). It can also lead to
passivity whenever the offended see themselves as victims of forces beyond their control.
As a matter of fact, many people in Lahore were equally morally shocked by the ‘cartoons’
but did not join the protest, thinking that it was ‘useless’ or because they ‘didn’t like
demonstration’. Thus, recruiting for collective mobilization requires more than shaking
people’s  inner  sense  of  morality.  It  also  has  to  do  with  the  pleasure  that  certain
individuals, but not others, feel in voicing their moral preferences in a public arena. The
anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protestors were not just outraged; they wanted everyone to know
that they occupied the moral high ground. As put by Nadeem, who regularly writes open
letter to newspapers on ‘world issues’, it was a matter of ‘talking to the world’.
28 Bringing participants to a protest also depends on the protest organisers’ framing work.
The outrage has to be labelled in a way that is locally meaningful, in other words linked to
a pre-existing repertoire of public sanctions, as emphasized by Jeanne Favret-Saada (1992:
257).  When asked how he discussed the issue during his khutba at  the mosque, imam
Tausif replied: ‘I informed people that this act was blasphemous and that the punishment
for the blasphemer is death. This is in the Quran’. This was a potent frame in the Pakistani
context where the Blasphemy Laws condemn as a crime punishable by the death penalty
if related to the Prophet, any ‘deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious
feelings’.
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29 Most commentators of the ‘Danish cartoons’ controversy barely envisaged, as was already
the case during the ‘Rushdie affair’, that ‘critical religious thoughts might exist among
ordinary people—enabling to blaspheme or to accuse of blasphemy’ (Favret-Saada 1992:
253).  This  is  surprising  because  what  triggered  the  wave  of  protest  was  precisely
qualifying the ‘cartoons’ as a blasphemy: a quintessential form of outrage that has no
intrinsic quality but implies drawing a line between what is tolerable and what is not
according to one’s religious believes.
30 The concept of ‘honour’ was a crucial element in drawing this line, as demonstrated by
the very name of the Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat Mahaz: ‘Front for the protection of the
honour of Muhammad’s prophecy’. This is how it could convince people that protesting
will not only be useful but also truly satisfying, bringing a sense of gratification ‘not of
achieving a utopia but of striving for one’ (Jasper 1997: 135). To the highly literal word ‘
namoos’,13 the interviewees preferred the more commonly used ‘izzat’. This multilingual
term defies  simple  translation:  it  is  ‘a  whole  complex of  emotionally  charged values
including honour, respect, reputation, shame, prestige and status’ (Dusenbery 1990: 242).
Covering  relationships  within  and  between  families,  as  well  as  social  relations  and
religious attitudes, it invokes a strong sense of personal and collective duty.
31 Interviewees linked a sense of izzat (in its multiple settings) and the need to protest. For
Hasnan, it was a religious injunction: ‘Once, the Prophet said: ‘if it is a matter of your
honour, stay silent, but if it’s a matter of Islam, my person and my family, go out of your
home and ask the offender ‘hey you, what’s your problem?’’;  a hadith he significantly
phrased in the modern ‘street  language’  of  honour-based confrontations  on Lahore’s
streets and colleges. For Ahmad, the ‘cartoons’ could be compared to insulting a family
member in the most dishonouring way imaginable: ‘Never mind, please, but it is as if
someone took pictures of your mother without clothes’.
32 Protestors,  nonetheless,  also  displayed  moral  balance,  cautious  in  evaluating  the
legitimacy of their reaction by questioning that of their opponent. They discussed with
great passion the concept of freedom of speech and, remarkably, through the grid of their
own personal experiences and emotional culture. While for Nadeem, the law student,
freedom of speech is a hollow ‘defence’ because it is not unlimited in European countries
either, for the Barelwi imam, ‘everyone one should have the right of freedom of opinions
in any field, but with Prophets and sacred personalities, one should be careful’. Hasnan,
the young naat singer, conveyed the point through a poetic metaphor (‘Man should talk in
such a way that flowers come out of his mouth, but its thorns should not wound the
other’).14
33 Finally Farhan, influenced by the JI’s concept-based ideological training, claims that, ‘this
concept called tolerance in European countries means that human beings are all equals,
even exceptional people such as Prophets. But in Islam tolerance does not exist, sacred
personalities  are  not  our  equals.  Our  concepts  are  not  the  same’.  This  striking
antiparastasis —what he is accused of (intolerance) is reframed as praiseworthy (it is good
to be intolerant)—,15 demonstrates that judgmental emotions and emotionally charged
values are functionally linked to cognitive processes.
 
Attributing blame
34 ‘How to provoke a worldwide crisis with twelve little drawings?’ asks Jeanne Favret-Saada
(2007)  half-provocatively.  Radical  imams  and  agitated  authoritarian  leaders  certainly
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played a key role in distorting the issue. But the ‘twelve little drawings’ are far from being
insignificant. It would indeed be misleading to posit too strong a distinction between a
Muslim  emotional  crowd  on  the  one  hand,  and  rational,  harmlessly  funny,  Danish
cartoonists on the other. Protestors’ emotions were very much a reflection of those that
motivated the ‘cartoons’: fear, anger, exasperation, desire to assert a moral superiority,
stigmatisation (we can laugh at  everything while  Muslims are  easily  manipulated by
intolerant and violent preachers). This was palpable in most of the drawings (the Prophet
as a terrifying sexist villain, suicide-bombers driven by sexual frustration, etc.).
35 Indeed, the power of an insult comes precisely from being ‘a divisive call for unanimity’
(Bouchet 2005: 273); even when humorous, it simultaneously rigidifies differences and
negates the right to be different. Protestors did not miss this dimension. The image of the
Prophet with a bomb in his turban is the only one that maulana Naeemi remembers a year
later:  ‘they  showed  the  Muslim  with  a  scary  face,  like  a  terrorist  about  to  devour
someone’.  This  was  a  very  sensitive  representation  in  the  post-9/11  context.  The
cartoonists wanted to warn people against the deviant usage of Islam for violent aims, but
from the receptors’ point of view (many of them sharing the same concern), it implied
that ‘Muslims’ in general—their Messenger was pictured, not individuals—were to blame.
36 For  Ahmed,  the  ‘most  insulting’  image was  the  Prophet  stopping suicide-bombers  at
heaven’s gate: ‘The Prophet is standing, a loose woman at his arm, and says ‘go, do suicide
bombing and you will be rewarded with a hoori’!’.16 The symbolic violence of the image is
not to joke about Islam. Contrary to the common reading of the anti-‘Danish cartoons’
protest as proving Muslims’ inability to laugh about their religion, popular humour is not
mistaken about the allegorical dimension of the hooris (that the drawing denies).17 What
hurt was the perceived intention to harm instead of encouraging the believer to think
about her/his own weaknesses. This attributed intention was a crucial element in the
mechanism of this particular outrage. All  the interviewees were absolutely convinced
that the ‘cartoons’ were deliberately drawn to hurt Muslims: it was ‘a conspiracy against
Islam’ by ‘them’ (‘Europe’, ‘the West’, ‘America’).
37 This is how ‘the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul’ could be
placed in a convincing ‘frame of injustice’ (Gamson 1992: 32), with a proper script and a
villain to blame. Farhan explains: ‘They say that these cartoons happened just by chance
but I don’t believe them. It was pre-planned. Publishing them once could have been a
mistake but  so  many countries  kept  on publishing them again and again’  (emphasis
added). For Ahmed, the conspiracy takes the shape of the ‘very strange foreign policy to
‘provoke and punish’  that  the CIA has  introduced against  the Muslims:  you provoke
someone, he reacts and you can punish him’. For maulana Naeemi, ‘Bush was behind all
this,  he  targets  Muslims  because  he  is  an  extremist  Christian’,  another  significant
antiparastasis echoed by Hasnan: ‘The people who committed this [the cartoons] and
disgrace Islam, I call them rebels, extremists actually’.
38 That the allocation of blame was framed as a ‘conspiracy theory’ should not be brushed
aside as  irrelevant  or  irrational.  Conspiracy theories  are a  key element in the social
construction of a protest. This particular ‘regimes of justification’ helps protestors, when
they speak from the ‘world of inspiration’ (emotions) to the ‘civic world’ (street protest,
for  instance)  and  the  ‘world  of  opinion’  (the  media),  to  lower  the  impressions  of
‘spontaneity’  and  irrationality  attached  to  their  emotional  reactions  (Boltanski  and
Thévenot 1991: 19). It acts, as well, as a ‘pragmatic constraint’ that ‘freezes the anxiety’
generated  by  the  ‘bad  intentions’  attributed  to  the  other (Thévenot  1995:  150);  it 
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rationalizes an intolerable situation (Why would anyone want to hurt me? Why are ‘they’
so insensitive to our love for our Prophet?). It ensures that the grievance engage a group,
hence calling for public recognition (otherwise it would be nothing more than a personal
suffering). Finally, it works as a strategy of ‘self-aggrandizement’ (Boltanski et al. 1984:
23), enhancing the status of the victim (How frightening I might be, hence powerful, if
such great powers try to hurt me!).
39 Conspiracy theories alone cannot explain how the protestors were eventually put into an
‘attack mode’ (Jasper 1997: 106). This was mediated by another widespread and decisive
way  of  reading  the  situation:  Muslims  were  not  only  ‘attacked’  but  ‘provoked’  and
‘tested’, in their sense of honour (‘the cartoonists’ wanted to test whether or not Muslims
would rise in the name of their Prophet’, imam Tausif), their resilience (‘they published
these cartoons just to see if Muslims could bear it, then step by step, they would make
bigger insults’, maulana Naeemi) and in their capacity to resist the spread of European
values (‘European countries thought that they can tease Muslims as much as they want
and Muslims will get used to their notion of tolerance’, Farhan). This explains why joining
the 14th February demonstration was described as a matter of ‘emotional commitment’
(Farhan): a way to assert that one could take up the challenge and fight back.
40 Yet again, other people in Lahore, sharing the emotional responses and moral valuations
described above, as well as the same conviction that they were ‘provoked’, did not join
the street protest. The question of how a predisposition to translates into an effective action
remains open and can only be addressed by looking at the protestor’s unique biography
and  individual  trajectory  (Fillieule  2001).  This  approach  is  applied  here  only  to  the
organiser of the Lahore protest: maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi. It gives invaluable information
about his ‘emotional culture’ and ‘emotional repertoires’ (Gould 2002: 178, Goodwin et al.
2001: 22).
 
‘I defeat those who denigrate the Prophet’: Biography and emotional
repertoire18
41 Maulana Sarfaraz  Naeemi,  is  not  only  a  professional  ‘mobilizer’  on  causes  revolving
around the ‘Prophet’s honour’ but also the heir of a line of Barelwi ulama who transmitted
to him a given repertoire of ‘outraged protests’.19 His father, ‘Hazrat’ Mufti Muhammad
Hussein  Naeemi  (1923-1998),  was  a  renowned alim from Muradabad (India)  who had
studied under  the  guidance of  maulana  Naeemudin Muradabadi  (1887-1948),  a  khalifa
(authorized  successor)  of  maulana  Ahmad  Riza  Khan  himself.  Muradabadi,  an  active
campaigner against the Arya Samaj and Christian missionaries in the United Provinces,
and in favour of the Khilafat movement and the creation of Pakistan, played an important
role in shaping the initial form that Barelwis’ mass activism took. After being send by his
master to Lahore, Naeemi’s father founded the Jamia Naeemia in 1953, and the very same
year started to campaign in the anti-Ahmadi movement.
42 Sarfaraz Naeemi took up the mantle of his father’s activist career after he died, albeit
being a pro-governmental alim as well,  part of the wider state’s project of ‘colonizing
Islam’ (Malik 1996).20 One of the stated, and unusual, objectives of his madrasa, as put in
its  brochure  (and just  after  its  educational  purpose),  is  ‘to  stop discords  (fitna) and,
according  to  the  needs  of  time,  to  organize  public  actions,  hold  conferences  and
processions’.  As  his  father  used  to  do,  he  mobilized  on  issues  revolving  around
Muhammad’s  prophecy.  The TNRM’s  duty,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  goes  well  beyond the
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‘Danish cartoons’ issue: it was ‘set up to ensure that if any threat come from foreign
governments and NGO to force the government of Pakistan to change its Islamic laws, we
are ready and can prevent the government from bowing down’.
43 This  vigilant  organization  was  precisely  formed,  in  2002,  in  reaction  to  President
Musharraf’s stated intention to reform the Blasphemy Laws. It organized a protest on this
issue, the same year, in Lahore, which interestingly, started from Data Sahab Darbar21—
the same point of departure chosen for the procession against the ‘Danish cartoons’. The
very name of the Front also attests the transmission of an emotional repertoire of protest:
it  is  borrowed  from  the  ‘Tehreek-i-Tahaffuz-i-Namoos-i-Risalat’  formed  by  another
Barelwi imam (Maulana Kausar Niazi) in February 1989 to lead the protest against The
Satanic Verses.
44 Why  are  issues  related  to  the  Prophet’s  honour  so  prominent  in  Naeemi’s  activist
trajectory? The answer lies in a frequently forgotten dimension of social protests: the
‘morally valued and compulsory collective (…) expression of feelings’ (Mauss 1969: 277)
that  they  involve.  This,  which  Marcel  Mauss  compared  to  a  form of  language,  is  a
permanent feature of modern social  movements where the convergence of emotional
attitudes has often less to do ‘with the spontaneous encounter of individual emotions, by
definition dissimilar’, than with the power of ‘the socially legitimate emotions that the
situation  itself  prescribes’  (Latté  2006:11).  In  Pakistan,  Barelwis  in  particular  are
supposed,  and  expected,  to  feel  strongly  about  the  Prophet  (Metcalf  1982:  300-302).
Assessing  his  prominent  position  and  exalting  his  greatness  is  at  the  core  of  their
identity.22 It is rooted in the belief that the Prophet is ‘light’ (‘His essence was of light but
he  came  to  us  in  human  form’  recalled  imam  Tausif  during  the  interview),  present
everywhere,  seeing  everything,  has  unique  knowledge  of  the  unknown  and  is  the
fundamental intercessor at Judgment Day and in day-to-day life matters.
45 As put by imam Tausif again, ‘the reason we came out on the road [against the ‘Danish
cartoons’]  was  the  emotions  that  any  Muslim  should have  had’  (emphasis  added) . 
Defending Muhammad’s prophecy is not just a ‘reflex emotion’ but also a ‘feeling rule’, ie.
a  ‘guideline  for  the  assessment  of  fits  and  misfits  between  feeling  and  situation’
(Hochschild 1979: 566). It is one of the rare issues on which Barelwi ulama organize, and
take the lead, of collective protests, such as the 1953 anti-Ahmadi movement (that they
termed  the  tehreek  khatm-e-nabuwwat or  ‘movement  for  the  finality  of  Muhammad’s
prophecy’),23 the second ‘round’ of the anti-Ahmadi campaign in 1974, 24 the 1977 anti-
Bhutto movement (that they rephrased as the ‘nizam-i-mustafa’)  and the 1988/89 anti-
Rushdie campaign.  This  is  why they were also at  the forefront of  the February 2006
procession in Lahore: to wash away the stain that the ‘Danish cartoons’ had spread on the
Prophet’s ‘reputation’.
 
The 14th February protest in Lahore: Staging
conflicting emotions
46 The Lahore protest was preceded by a wave of demonstrations in the country. The first
one, and a spontaneous one it seems, was held in Peshawar, in early February 2006, by a
group of government college students. The movement then spread to the tribal agencies,
Islamabad and Rawalpindi, before coming back to Peshawar where it turned violent on 13
th  February. Yet,  the two main organizers of the 14th February protest in Lahore—the
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Qaumi  Tajir  Ittehad  (QTI),  the  largest  association  of  local  traders  who  announced  a
complete shutter-down strike,  and Maulana Naeemi—expected it  to be peaceful.  They
were proved wrong. The issue at stake was such that, in addition to the JUP, many other
political and religious parties joined such as, and critically so, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)25
and both factions of the PML.
 
From communitas to destruction
47 The  protestors—about  5,000  to  10,000—formed  a  heteroclite  crowd.  Beside  traders,
shopkeepers and party activists, most were Barelwi madrasa students.26 There were also a
lot of youngsters from the Old City and popular districts—the jeans/bandana clad ‘wheely
boys’ (thus called for their motorbike stunts) or ‘the kind of guys who stand in front of
college girls’ as a friend farcically describes them—along with students from government
colleges. Other social groups were present in pockets such as lawyers, journalists, low-
rank civil servants, etc. Some had also come from the city’s surrounding villages. The
crowd was nevertheless homogeneous in terms of gender (exclusively men) and class:
residents from posh areas were almost entirely absent.
48 Although leaders spent a lot of energy in convincing people that ‘it [was] not a political
issue’ (as put by maulana Naeemi), the protest was far from apolitical: slogans invariably
blamed the Pakistani government for its inability to ‘protect Muslims’ and for its alliance
‘with the US’. This ambiguity was inscribed in the route of the protest itself. It started
from Data Darbar’s  shrine in the Old City  to  reach the Punjab Assembly after  going
through Mall Road (or The Mall). This road is the nerve of the city, linking the Northern
Old City to the Southern upper middle-class and elite residential areas, a major shopping
centre,  a concentration of  colleges and universities and the place where most of  the
government’s  buildings  are  located  (Secretariat,  High  Court,  Provincial  Assembly,
Governor’s House). The spatial set-up of the demonstration itself was, indeed, part of the
many dispositions for the emotional dramaturgy of anger to take place,  and a major
reason for it getting out of hand as well.
49 The protestors mainly formed an expressive crowd.  There were no expectations that
policies will be changed, no material gains to fight for, and no attempts to resolve a given
problem. The objective was to ‘express our emotions in our actions’ (Farhan) and ‘to send
to the cartoonists the message that for the Muslims it is a very important issue so they’ll
stop printing these cartoons’  (Nadeem).  Though there is  no reason to infer  that  the
organizers did not share the same sense of  indignation,  they certainly,  and skilfully,
mobilized anger.  All  along the procession route,  a symbolic duel was fought between
loved and hated characters.
50 Slogans were raised in praise of the Prophet (such as the conventional nara-e-risalat— ‘Oh
Messenger of  God!’—and ‘Who has  no love for  Muhammad,  doesn’t  deserve to live’).
‘Villains’ were booed: interestingly not so much the cartoonists but ‘Denmark’, ‘the Jews’
and the ‘Bush-Mush (Musharraf)-Blair’ trilogy whose effigies were burnt in the street,
hence  transforming  the  issue  into  a  conflict  between  singular,  and  more  familiar,
personalities. This Schmittian narrative was ‘no mere cognitive feat but require[d] the
mobilization  and  sustaining  of  powerful  feelings  (Ost  2004:  240):  the  ‘outraged
community’ that had gathered on The Mall was called upon to act as a sanctioning judge
in this fight between good and evil and to personify a reclaimed dignity.
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51 The street procession was,  indeed,  staged as a ‘social  drama’,  a  ‘disharmonic process
arising in conflict situations’, trough which not only ‘conflicting groups (...) attempt to
assert their own and deplete their opponents’ paradigm’, but also reinvest their religious
paradigms ‘with vitality’ (Turner 1974: 35, 37). The crowd was the embodied umma; an
identity that, far from being an ‘artefact’, was ‘felt, expressed, reinvented, claimed’ (Cefaï
2007: 258) and put in presence of itself. As remembered by Hasnan ‘I was in the middle of
the procession, we were holding each other’s hands (…) we were lost in our love for the
Prophet’.  Rather  than  an  imagined  community,  this  umma  was  simultaneously
represented and engendered as a ‘communitas’: an ‘undifferentiated, equalitarian, direct,
nonrational (though not irrational), I-Thou or Essential We relationships’ uniting people
‘over and above any formal social bonds’ (Turner 1974: 53, 45). And as stressed by Victor
Turner, it is precisely in conditions on the peripheries of everyday life, such as a street
protest, that the ‘wind of existential communitas’ can better be felt and the communitas
itself experienced as an ‘eternal now’ (Turner 1974: 243, 238).
52 But ‘social dramas’ are not just about displaying an ‘eternal now’: they are also ‘forcing
people to take side in terms of deeply entrenched moral imperatives’ (Turner 1974: 35).
The ‘cartoons’  were perceived as a rupture or incoherency in the normative order,  a
threat to the protestors’ intimate beliefs and convictions. Hence, the demonstration was
also a matter of moral sanctioning:  imam Tausif  remembered that when he joined it,
‘emotions were very high, each party was holding its flag, people were holding banners
demanding that the cartoonists apologise to the entire Muslim world and do toba [vow
not to do it again]’. Truly, protestors ‘do not simply or directly try to change what they
dislike—which  may  not  be  possible—,  they  also  express  contempt  and  outrage  over
existing practices’ (Jasper 1997: 5): it is their ability to provide a moral voice that makes
protest  activities  so  satisfying.  The  Lahori  demonstrators  could  dream  that  the
cartoonists will be ‘captured and punished’ (according to Hasnan, who yet had no idea of
how that could happen) and if that was impossible, at least be made answerable for what
they did: ‘we took out the processions to tell to the government that ‘if you cannot do
anything, at least give a call to Denmark and ask ‘why did you do this to us?’’ (Hasnan).
53 This fight between a public good and a public wrong, ‘mise en forme, en scène et en sens’
(Cefaï 2007: 409), ended up in an uncontrollable anger (and joy) of destroying and looting
that turned The Mall into a ‘war zone’ for six hours. The pattern of violence was similar to
many other riots (Janowitz 1979): the rioters first attacked the emblems of public order,
and  once  the  security  forces  show  signs  of  weakness,  they  split  into  small  groups,
smashing offices and shops,  burning motorbikes and cars,  looting western fast-foods,
shops, offices.  When they tried to rob an ATM machine, two rioters were killed by a
private guard. One group set on fire the old Diyal Singh Mansion where a Shezan bakery
was  located,  while  others  attacked  the  Pakistan  International  Airlines’  office,  travel
agencies, the Norwegian mobile company Telenor outlets, etc.
54 The  evolution  of  the  targets  clearly  show  a  progressive  lifting  of  inhibitions:  from
breaking traffic signals and pelting stones at  a police station to taking a high police
official  hostage— when he tried to calm the rioters—and beating him up,  and finally
breaking off the police cordon at the provincial Assembly and set one of its rooms on fire.
The Rangers (a paramilitary unit) were called in and stayed in the city for twenty days. M
any ‘mini-riots’ nonetheless continued on the following days, targeting petrol pumps and
bakeries in different parts of the city. At the end, 135 protestors were arrested, a hundred
buildings were broken and 400 cars and motorcycles damaged (Khan 2006).
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55 Many of the protestors I interviewed were shocked by what seemed to be an ‘issueless
riot’ (Marx 1970), remembered as ‘the day Lahore burnt’ (as happened in 1947). Farhan,
the former IJT activist and an old hand at demonstrations, put the blame, interestingly,
on a bad management of emotions:
Usually, groups who organize demonstrations know how to control the crowd when
it becomes too emotional. Political and religious workers are trained for that and
know how far they can go. But in this protest,  people from neighbourhood, the
common  public,  came  to  express  their  emotion,  they  had  no  leadership,  no
coordination, they were not part of any system (emphasis added).
56 Truly, when the Barelwi leadership tried to address the crowd, it proved useless. Imam
Tausif  remembers:  ‘our  ulama  said  on  the  loudspeaker:  ‘Stop  the  [rioters],  brothers!
They’re not our people, they’re creating chaos!’ But no one listened’. But Nadeem gives
another picture:  ‘some people were totally uncontrollable but others were instigating
them’. The ‘khufia haat’ (secret hand)27 was, indeed, the most widespread explanation for
the violence, given by the police, the press, political parties and the organizers’ alike.
There were, certainly, disconcerting facts: violence erupted as soon as the protest started
while men carrying guns and law-enforcement officials in civvies were spotted guiding
the crowd.
57 Yet, the crowd was not simply ‘imitative’, to borrow on the old psychosocial theories:
certain acts of violence made sense, such as attacking a Shezan bakery allegedly owned by
an Ahmadi, others not. For instance, when a man tried to push the crowd to attack a
Christian church, shouting from the top of a roof ‘kill the kuffar (infidels), burn them!’,
people looked at him indifferently thinking he was a ‘crazy drug addict’.28 To understand
the inner logic  of  violence,  we need to go ‘inside’  the crowd;  ‘only in interpretative
biographies, in the narrated experience, can we understand the symbolic dimension of
violent transgression, of performative acts in need of a public’ (Weisbrod 2002: 555).
 
A rioter’s testimony: The street boy and the policemen
58 Waqas is 22 years and lives in Rang Mahal, in the heart of the Old City. His participation to
the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest was primarily a matter of a peer group’s adventure,
another form of  ‘programme’  in the colloquial  language of  Lahore’s  street  boys:  ‘My
friends called and said ‘hep, what’s up man [kia programme hai yaar]?’ There’s a strike
tomorrow on this cartoons thing, let’s go’’. Though quite shy, he laughs constantly when
recalling his ‘heroic deed’ on that day. After the friends came out at Bhatti Gate (one of
Walled City’s twelve gates), he casually explains: ‘Two policemen passed in front of us, we
trashed them badly, took our bikes and run away’. When I asked him if they had done
something to him, he replied even more casually: ‘No, I just felt like it [dil kar raha tha]’.
His childhood friend adds in the same laughing tone ‘He’s our Shahrukh Khan,29 angry
even before meeting his enemy!’
59 But Waqas gives at this point a meaningful precision: ‘Yep, it was an old anger. Police
fined me a lot of time. First, they accept small bribe, then ask for more and if you don’t
have the money, they give you a chalan [fine]. It’s a real pain then, you have to queue at
the bank’. After a short silence, he adds: ‘So what? Beating up policemen is no big deal,
they  beat  people  all  the  time  no?’  His  friend,  significantly  pursuing  on  the  movie
metaphor, adds: ‘Him and his brother, they always get a 36 at the lottery!30 They’re the
famous badmash [goons] of Rang Mahal’. As a matter of fact, when we met, Waqas’ elder
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brother was in jail (he had opened fire in a street fight)…but using a police car to visit his
family.
60 After  beating the  policemen,  Waqas  and his  friends  joined the  protest,  put  on their
headbands with the inscription ‘Ya Ali Madad’ (‘Oh Ali help me!’)31 and chanted slogans in
praise of the Prophet. When they reached the lower portion of The Mall, they saw ‘the
police beating up a lot of people, people threw stones at them and the police fired back
tear gas’. They then saw other people destroying buildings: ‘We got emotional and did it
as well, but wee didn’t start, we just joined. We broke windows, KFC, Telenor signboards,
traffic  signals  but  no cars,  that  we didn’t  do’.  He then describes  different  groups of
rioters:
When we left, we heard that they killed a guard, but it’s not us, those were just
bandits [dakoo]. There were also Jihadis there. But those who started the violence
were students, from MAO College and Diyal Singh College. Someone had told them
what to do, what to break. I also saw two boys opening straight fire but those were
just ‘show-offs’  [shokhe larke].  And those robbing bakeries and food outlets were
villagers, daily labourers (added in a despising tone).
61 Waqas’ testimony clearly demonstrates the limit of the ‘frustration model’ to explain
violence; an explanation of the February 2006 riot incidentally favoured by many among
Lahore’s  liberal  elite  but  theoretically  flawed,  simply  because  we  cannot  infer  that
individuals facing the same objective conditions will react with similar behaviours (a bias
present in all structural analysis). Waqas is not part of a lumpenproletariat marauding mob:
his father is a property dealer, he has his own motorbike and the family recently moved
to a well-furnished house in a middle-class locality in the Northeast of the city. Sure,
some deprived youngsters used this opportunity to rob any valuable goods they could put
their hands on, such as these two unemployed boys who proudly told their friends about
their  ‘successful  strikes’  during  the  riot  (mobile  phone  sets  lifted  from  an  office)
(Mahmood  2006)  or  the  rural  migrant  who,  truly,  can  ill  afford  the  pastries  and
hamburgers they tasted on that day.
62 Rather than social class, group belonging matters here. Waqas is what is locally known as
a ‘lafanga’ (‘ruffian’), ‘aawara’ (litteraly ‘vagabond’) or, in Punjabi and not necessarily in a
negative sense, a ‘wela jea banda’, which has the dobble meaning of an ‘idle’ and ‘free guy’
(free from any commitment). These diverse ‘labels’ describe a well-defined category of
young men in the city: who easily get into fights and who don’t study or work out of
choice.  Waqas  indeed  dropped  his  private  school  because  he  ‘was  not  interested  in
studies’ and he does not want to work (although he learnt the skill of crafting jewellery).
When mentioning  the  Pakistani  employees  who  lost  their  jobs  because  of  the  riot’s
destruction, he dismissively replies: ‘That’s up to God’. For the ‘wela jea banda’, living on
his joint family’s incomes, those compelled to work are ‘losers’. His way of life is to be
‘free’, have fun with his (exclusively male) peer group, ‘play cricket and watch TV’, spend
a lot of time out in the streets and do motorbikes’ stunts.
63 This does not mean, at all, that Waqas’ anger was faked. Raised in the Barelwi tradition,
he strongly feels  about  the ‘Danish cartoons’  ‘insult’.  He does  not  dwell  on intricate
conspiracy theories, contrary to university students, but says: ‘They had been rude to our
Holy Prophet, for us he is a God just after God and I got angry. I swear I would kill the guy
who’s done these cartoons if ever he comes in front of me!’ He then takes a fighter’s
posture and adds ‘We can insult their God as well and see how they’ll get angry!’ In his
social universe, where a gustakh (a rude person)’s comment leads to an immediate fight,
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you don’t  react  by breaking diplomatic  relations  or calling for  public  apologies:  you
silence your opponent, even if miles away, by showing your strength (‘If Muslims all over
the world were united, no one would dare saying anything to them’ adds he). To put your
enemy down, you certainly don’t rely on a corrupt and weak government; it is people’s
responsibility to fight back by ‘destroying’ and ‘burning’. He explains: ‘The government
didn’t take any action on this. Only the people did something’. When I ask him ‘what did
the people do?’ he replies ‘Many things, they broke shops, cars and official buildings, they
destroyed foreign companies so that they get out of our country, they burnt effigies of
the British Prime Minister’.
64 His ‘idle’ life does not mean, either, that Waqas’ moral visions are secondary motivations
to protest.  He is  proud to have been,  somehow, the voice of  the people on this day,
accomplishing something that was morally right: ‘What happened was right [sahi tha], the
person  who  made  the  cartoon  had  to  be  punished’;  something  the  destruction
symbolically accomplished. The young man also alluded several times to his need for
moral self-improvement. When his friend described him, for instance, as just ‘sleeping all
day long, drinking and watching porno movies at night’, the young rioter smiled very
uncomfortably:32 he had just explained that opening a madrasa was ‘a must’ for all ‘good
Muslims’  and  that  the  Dawat-i-Islami  (a  proselyte  Barelwi  organization)  was  rightly
‘making people understand that they should offer their prayers’. His moral valuation was
also clearly visible in his narrative of legitimate targets during the riots: no Pakistani
shops,  cars  and bikes,  only  foreign companies  and the  police.  He  clearly  dissociated
himself from the ‘robbers’ and the ‘show off boys’ (violent out of greed and vanity). His
own violence had a righteous flavour: vengeance, against the offending ‘West’(…) and the
local police.
65 The emotional and moral frames prescribed by any given social interactions are never
fully constraining:  they are precarious and sometimes they break when experiencing
dissonance (Goffman 1974). This happened during the Lahore riot at the time of the first
encounter with the police, on the Lower Mall: it displaced the locus and motivations of
the demonstrators from a show of love to the Prophet to a ‘police and thief’ game. The
police, totally unprepared and disorganized, was indeed forced to push back rioters, here
and there, thus increasing the playful dimension of the violence. More importantly, the
police sent mix signals: in some parts of the procession it displayed empathy, chanting
slogans with the crowd, in others it used repression. This contradiction mirrored that of
Waqas’ day-to-day interactions with a police that arrests his own brother but acts like
any other criminal group (a widespread perception, and reality, in Pakistan) when bribing
him.33 In his view, attacking the two policemen was, somehow, part of a natural justice.
66 The second important situational dissonance that Waqas underlines is the inner conflicts
within  the  crowd:  first,  the  presence  of  Jihadist  militants.  Truly,  the  TNRM  was
immediately  engaged in  an ‘emotional  warfare’  (Goodwin et  al. 2004:  417)  with  rival
doctrinal groups, whose very presence was felt as a provocation. Imam Tausif recalls: ‘A
group of people from the JuD tried to join us but our [Barelwi] ulama asked them to put
down their flags, they refused and we had an argument with them’. One of the chief
organizers is even convinced that the staunchly anti-Barelwi JuD was told by the Punjab
government  to  start  the  destructions  on  The  Mall—a  street  where  Jihadist  groups
organized, all along the 1990s, many protests—in order to defame the Barelwi-initiated
procession. The competition between diverse Islamic groups for the monopoly to express
the ‘inner essence’  of  Muslims in Pakistan is  fought not  only from the mosques and
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madrasas’ compounds but, increasingly, on a wider public arena, such as TV channels
and, importantly, the streets of Pakistan’s main cities. This is the main locus where the
various religious sects struggle for public visibility and, as much as Muslims and Hindus
used to do in colonial times, ‘re-negotiate their relationship (among themselves and with
the state)’ (Freitag 1989: xii).
67 In  the  context  of  Pakistan’s  religious  sectarianism,  this  is  particularly  important,
especially in Punjab where Barelwism has, historically, its core of supporters.34 Barelwi
ulama had always been at the centre of sectarian controversies as they were, at their
inception ‘an oppositional group as much as they were reformers, not even—as one might
think—  representing  a  continuity  with  the  past  but  rather,  in  their  very  self-
consciousness, representing a departure from it’ (Metcalf 1982: 296). Yet, and as a result
of  General  Zia  (1977-88)’s  pro-Deobandi  and  Ahl-i-Hadith  inclinations  and  of  the
mushrooming  of  Jihadists  groups  from  these  two  traditions,  Barelwi  ulama were
progressively  put  on  the  defensive.  Polemics  became  more  intense  and  increasingly
opposed them to the state,35 as well to new Jihadist organization such as the Ahl-i-Hadith
JuD,  one  of  the  most  active  in  trying to  convert  the  Barelwi-inclined section of  the
Pakistani  society  (a  majority)  to  its  Wahhabi-oriented  school  of  thought  (a  small
minority).
68 The presence of Jihadist groups was not the only one to foster unconventional emotions
or  ‘outlaw  emotions’  (Jaggar  1989:  161).  As  Waqas  recalls,  ‘college  boys  started  the
violence’; a point made by other interviewees as well. When a group of college students
tried to remove a picture of President Musharraf and Chaudhry Elahi (the PML-Q Punjab
Chief Minister) on the Lower Mall, they were baton-charged by the police and attacked, in
return, a police station. The wider context of students’ politics in Lahore sheds light on
this incident. Though banned, student unions survived as the youth arms of Pakistan’s
political  parties.36 Their  rivalries  since  the  late  1980s  had been extremely  violent  in
government colleges and universities,37 particularly so in MAO, Diyal Singh and Islamiya
colleges  where the  ‘college  boys’  of  the  14th Februay  protest  were  coming  from .  A
plausible explanation is that the violence erupted as a result of an internal ‘PML campus
war’:  MSF-N  (Muslim  Student  Front-Nawaz  Sharif)  partisans  might  have  broken  the
pictures of the PML-Q Chief Minister and of Musharraf nearby the police station, while
MSF-Q activists burnt the room of the Opposition leaders (a slot then occupied by PPP and
PML-N politicians) in the Punjab Assembly—the only one attacked in the building.
69 Waqas’ testimony therefore shows that the Lahore riot formed a part of larger incidences
of everyday violence, occurring in a wide range of social and political contexts (family,
colleges, streets, etc.). But the way he recalls it also reveals that another positive emotion
was at play: fun, this ‘array of ad hoc, nonroutine, and joyful conducts where individuals
break  free  temporarily  from  the  disciplined  constraints  of  daily  life,  normative
obligations, and organized power’ (Bayet 2007: 1). The festive mood of the rioters actually
struck me. As an observer put it ‘Look at them! Running with their McDo burgers, chased
by the police, it is like a game’. This quest for fun, a crucial dimension of urban violence
in Pakistan, does not, however, results from ‘a lack of other opportunities for leisure (…)
an  explanation  of  political  mobilization  in  terms  of  boredom  and,  ultimately,
unemployement—(…) that is popular in the right-wing press and the established elite’
(Verkaaik 2004: 185).
70 The enjoyement in transgressing rules, as shown by Oskar Verkaaik in his study of the
Muhajir  Qaumi  Movement’s  collective actions,  is  primarilly  that  of  reversing socially
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ascribed roles. This had at least four expressions during the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ riot: 1/
to  ridicule  humilating  policemen  in  a  publicly  displayed  jugat;38 2/  to  frighten  the
‘affluent’ by breaking their symbols of consummerism; 3/ to disobey the elders (parents,
generally unaware of their kids’ participation to the protest, but also religious leaders
unable to control the crowd); 4/ and to literaly enter into the politics’ reserved domain,
the Punjab Assembly. The crowd acted as a ‘leveler’ (Tambiah 1996: 278), sharing a sense
of taking righteous action not just against the ‘outraging West’ but also to level down the
society’s hierarchy.
 
The local imaginaires of riots
71 One piece is nevertheless missing in the travel inside the dynamics of the crowd that
Waqas’ testimony provided. When at the very beginning of the interview, he said ‘I swear
I would kill the guy who’s drawn these cartoons if ever he comes in front of me!’ he
immediately added ‘I’ll kill him at once like Ghazi Ilamdin Shahid did’. This allusion is
quite fascinating because it not only refers to one of the first communal riots in Lahore
but also was a dispute over printed words and the application of the blasphemy law in
pre-partition time. Waqas explains:
Sometime ago, Ghazi Ilamdin Shahid killed a guy who had published a book against
Islam but  the British government had him hanged.  He was a resident  from my
neighbourhood,  Rang Mahal,  there  is  a  Ghazi  Ilamdin Chowk (square)  a  minute
away from my home, many places are named after him, clinics, schools, etc. each
kid knows about him.
72 Indeed, in 1927, the colonial courts arrested a Hindu man who had published a book (
Rangila  Rasul,  ‘The  Merry  Messenger  of  God’),  found to  be  prone  to  provoke  enmity
between  Hindus  and  Muslims.39 After  his  release  from  prison  two  years  later,  the
publisher was stabbed to death by a young Muslim, Ilam Din. The Lahore High Court
sentenced Din to be hanged.  Huge demonstrations erupted and British officials  were
eventually forced to return his body to his family. Ilam Din received a hero burial and was
given  the  honorific  title  of  ghazi (‘victorious’)  and  shahid (‘martyr’)  by  the  Muslim
notables of Rang Mahal. Hence, and although participants often described the rioters as
‘teenagers  who watched too much Indian movies  and wanted to be hero’  (as  put  by
Ramzan), the quest for heroism proves much more complex. It needs to be contextualized
at the light of  the rioters’  local  imaginaires of  violence —an imaginaire kept alive and
meaningful by the other riots that had happened in the city since the late 1920s.
73 The  pattern  of  riots  in  Lahore  from  the  late  1920s  till  today40 demonstrates  the
progressive  domination  of  a  vocabulary  of  protest  revolving  not  on  socio-political
conflicts anymore but on competing religious selves. One of the first riots in pre-Partition
Lahore was precisely the one Waqas alluded to. The next agitation, in 1935, also took
place in the Old City but this time over the ‘Shahidganj Masjid’; a dispute over a sacred
site  (revered  by  both  Muslims  and  Sikhs)  which  contributed  to ‘dramatize  (…)  the
emotional  power  and  political  importance  of  Islamic  symbols’  in  Punjabi  politics’
(Gilmartin 1988: 100).41 The second major wave of riots happened during the dreadful
1947 ‘communal war of succession’ (Talbot 2006: 44) which was, also, particularly intense
in the areas from which the 14th February 2006 protestors were coming from (Walled City,
Krishan Nagar,  Sant Nagar,  Shah Almi,  Gawalmandi,  Anarkali)  and in The Mall—were
Hindus  and  Sikhs  owned  most  of  the  shops  and  buildings  (such  as  the  Diyal  Singh
Mansion which was burnt down during the 2006 protest).
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74 In post-Partition Lahore, riots continued to centre on a public assertion of ‘Muslim-ness’.
This was the case of  the 1952-53 anti-Ahmadi campaign,  which soon turned,  like the
anti-‘Danish  cartoons’  riots,  into  an  anti-upper  class  riot42 and  compelled  the  Army
similarly to step in. In 1977, riots erupted again in the Old City during the nizam-i-mustafa
movement, which became a popular protest, attracting lower middle-class shopkeepers
and madrasa students after the police fired at a crowd at the Muslim Masjid in Lohari
Gate. From the late 1970s onwards, as ‘Muslim-ness’ came to be differently defined by the
Pakistani  state (see  below),  riots  centred  on  international  and  sectarian  issues.  In
November 1979, when false rumour spread that the United States and Israel had seized
the Grand Mosque in Mecca, a mob set Lahore’s American Cultural on fire. In 1992, as a
counter-reaction to the Babri Masjid destruction in India, crowds attacked Hindu and Jain
temples in the Old City. Riots then erupted out of the wave of sectarian killings: in 1997
(after the leader of the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan was killed in a bomb explosion at the
Lahore Court) and in 1998 (after the Mominpura Shia graveyard’s massacre planned by a
SSP splinter group). Then came the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ riots.
75 Other forms of social protests do happen in Lahore. Actually, more or less organized and
small demonstrations over socio-economic issues, such as power outage, occur on a daily
basis and sometimes turn violent. But large-scale riots, involving different sectors of the
society—the youth, shopkeepers, madrasa students, middle-class clerks, political parties
activists, etc.—mainly revolve around identity-based emotional politics. Although these
riots are often used as derivative to partisan objectives,43 we still have to explain why in
most instances they look like ‘trials of status’ or ‘moral crusades’.44
 
The Pakistani state’s politics of emotions
76 As shown by the quoted interviews, and Waqas’ one in particular, ‘moral outrage (…) are
related to moral intuitions, felt obligations and rights (…) all of which are culturally and
historically situated variables’  (Goodwin et al.  2001:  13).  This implies that the role of
emotions in collective protests cannot be fully understood without moving away from its
micro-level expressions, and looking at the ‘emotional-institutional context within which
social  movements  do  their  emotion  work’  (Flam  2005:  19).  The  way  the  state
emotionalizes, and consequently depoliticizes, the public sphere is, indeed, hard to ignore
in South Asian countries, where riots often take the shape of ‘moral crusades’ precisely,
and where the post-colonial state inherited a politics of social control precisely based on
the assumption of the ‘emotional subject’.
 
The ‘politics of self-expression’
77 Why did the Pakistani government authorize the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protests? Was
this, as many times before, a way of ‘cultivating the religious lobby’, a maneuver used by
‘the  military-bureaucratic  state  (…)  in  its  search  for  legitimacy’  (Jalal  2001:  572)?
Certainly. But there is much more to identity politics in Pakistan than this top-down
instrumentalist approach suggests. Tambiah (1996: 322) assesses that riots in Pakistan can
not be seen as ‘popular expressions of a moral economy grounded in a broad consensus
spelled  out  by  the  authority  of  the  nation-state’  because  ‘the  environment  lacks  a
crystallized  and  coherent  nation-state  ideology  and  a  body  of  political  norms  and
practices  deriving  from it  and  shared  by  all’.  By  looking  for  a  (ever  elusive)  broad
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consensus,  he misses  a  crucial  point:  state’s  norms and practices  matter  in order  to
understand why certain causes and certain emotional repertoire make sense or not.
78 The gradual consolidation, and state’s sponsorship, of what Markus Daechsel forcefully
conceptualizes as the ‘politics of  self-expression’,  proved determinant in focusing the
public  debate  over  a  conception of  individuals  as  ‘inward-looking and self-contained
subjects whose sole purpose was the self-expression of their inner essences’ (Daechsel
2006: 1-2). Actually, this peculiar politics truly comes to life in disputes over sacred places
or offensive publications fought in the street, as noted by Daechsel (2006: 70).45 This is
when, and where, the feeling of power of an eternal ‘we’ can be combined with a feeling
of  authenticity;  this  very  authentic  Muslim-ness  that  claimed  for  recognition  by  an
imaginary  audience  during  the  anti-‘Danish  cartoons’  riot,  and  that  the  Musharraf’s
government was accused of being unable to protect.
79 This  peculiar  political  culture,  formed  in  1930s-50s  Urdu-speaking  groups,  was
particularly pervasive among the Lahori middle class milieu; a group occupying a middle-
ground position, lower to the established elite but above the labouring proletariat and, as
said,  a major actor during the anti-‘Danish cartoons’  protest.  Along with much more
radical political activists, the founding father of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself
(who  used  to  say  ‘Islam  really  means  action’),  but  also  the  early  Muslim  League
ideologues, particularly in their students wing (MSF) and the Urdu conservative press—
two critical transmitters of the ‘Danish cartoons’ outrage—played, historically, a crucial
role.  They popularised a  political  culture obsessed with abstract  wars  and identities,
revolving around symbolic matters and meant to ‘stimulate an affective emotional state
of empowerment’ (Daechsel 2006: 57). They also shaped the vision of Pakistan as a meta-
historical collective whose Muslim inhabitants’ right to exist is constantly threatened in a
universe of perpetual warfare and conspiracies.
80 This founds strong echoes in the February 2006 protestors’ systems of opposition, their
paranoid grid of worldwide conspiracies, and their conviction that the ‘cartoonists’ had
to  be  ‘captured’  or  physically  destroyed,  as  they  were essentially not  reformable.
Inheritors of a deep and enduring legacy of self-expressionism, the protestors ‘certain
that they knew the substance of morality, could overlook the process of morality: the
discourse, life passages, innovation, and learning by which we can continually interrogate
ourselves about our moral sensibilities’ (Jasper 1997: 365).
81 Daechsel (2006: 202-210) notes that the politics of self-expression receded in the 1960s, re-
emerged during Zia’s rule (1977-88),  to decline again till  the recent apparition of the
media-obsessed cult of terrorism and suicide missions; an ultimate extentions of the old
self-expressionism (the body itself is politics). In my opinion, this political culture on the
contrary progressively consolidated; a process which, as matter of fact, explains why the
martyr phenomenon in Pakistan is far from being an outcome of the ‘war on terror’
alone. More to the point, the Lahore riot clearly proved how symbolic wars opposing
individuals’  essence  and  ‘meta-historical  collectivities’  continue  to  be  a  much  more
appealing idiom of protest for middle-class milieu46 than socio-economic issues, or even
interests-based politics.
82 General  Zia,  truly,  proved  dramatically  important  in  ensuring  the  longevity  of  the
process. His Islamization programme meant, basically, that ‘debates about democracy,
economy,  education,  culture,  women’s  issues,  human  rights’  issues  as  well  as  the
functioning of bureaucracy, judiciary and army drew heavily on the divine sources of
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morality, authenticity and accountability’ (Waseem 2007: 153). ‘Islamizing’ the legal and
educational systems, and army’s lower ranks, was precisely, as well, a strategic use of self-
expressionism so as to curb the political empowerment of the marginalized social groups
that Ali Bhutto had, to a certain extent but for the first time, facilitated in the previous
decade. Indeed, one of the strongest effects of the politics of self-expression is to impede
a politically conscious urban middle class to emerge. This mainstream ‘anti-societal form
of politics’ cannot provide a type of collective identity that can be a basis for class action
because it precisely denigrates the local, the immediate, ignores or denounces as petty
and distractive ‘the stuff of every-day life—how people cooperate and struggle with each
other,  how  they  exchange  goods  and  values,  how  they  exercise  and  resist  power  ‘
(Daechsel 2006: 1).
83 Finally, and as importantly for the remit of this article, as it is in this peculiar ‘emotional-
institutional  context’  that  social  movements  did  their  ‘emotion  work’  during  the
anti-‘Danish  cartoons’  protest:  Zia  did  not  just  rely  on  the  colonial  legacy  of  the
‘emotional subjects’ entrusted in the Blasphemy Laws, but exacerbated it. Kept in India
and Bangladesh as well, these laws took a peculiar turn in Pakistan.47 Zia altered them to
expel Ahmadis even further from ‘Muslim-ness’, introducing more strident rules against
them in 1984. He then introduced the most controversial article 295-C in 1986, which
dramatically shifted the institutionalised ‘rules of emotions’ by authorizing the state to
kill its ‘unauthentic’ subject in wider and even more ambiguous situations.48 This is a
critical point for our understanding of the anti-‘Danish Cartoons’ protest. First, because
82% of  the victims of  the Blasphemy Laws (and in majority Muslims)  live in Punjab,
especially in the northern districts and lower middle-class areas of Lahore where false
accusations  of  blasphemy have become a  lethal  instrument  in social  and economical
conflicts (NCJP 2007: 60-83).
84 Secondly, and if nothing else, these laws made labelling the ‘cartoons’ as ‘blasphemous’
legally  acceptable,  and  politically  legitimate,  empowering  the  National  Assembly  to
unanimously ban them, compelling the government to allow the protests and, leading the
Supreme Court  to  order  (April  2006),  the  unrealistic  yet  significant  registration of  a
blasphemy  case  against  the  cartoonists,  foreign  newspapers’  owners  and  (…)  the
chairman of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (who had failed to block websites
showing  the  cartoons!).  Thirdly,  the  historical  affinity  between these  laws  and anti-
Ahmadism also elucidates why rioters selected their targets in ‘a repertory of traditional
punishment’ (Zemon Davis 1973: 81): setting on fire a bakery after rumours spread that it
was owned by an Ahmadi49 but ignoring calls to attack churches.
85 Not a single government has been able to remove this critical instrument of the state’s
politics of emotions. Musharraf attempted but failed. The main reason is that, like his
military predecessor, he relied on de-ideologizing politics to sustain his rule and allied
with  the  best  gatekeeper  of  self-expressionism:  the  Punjab-based  PML.  This  party,
dominant in Lahori politics50 and an important actor in the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest,
is the main spokesman of anti-societal politics in Pakistan (even more so than the Islamist
parties); a legacy of initially shaping its political program in opposition to the Hindu-
dominated Congress, and then to the consociational model of the pre-partition Unionist
Party in Punjab. It has nothing to say about Pakistani society, except that its ‘Muslim’
families should avoid ‘obscene entertainment’ (basically any activity where the control
over women’s body is at stake). It also supported, for instance, a bill to make death as a
mandatory punishment for blasphemy in 1992, tried to impose a Sharia Bill in 1998 and
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when it talks about citizenship, it is to protect Pakistanis’ ‘inner essence’, as proven by its
stand over the ‘religious column’ in the National Identity Cards and Passports.51
 
The middle-class youth, body politics and agency
86 Certainly, at a personal level ‘Muslims in Pakistan have not been passive recipients of
attempts by state authority to define and institute an Islamic order’ (Kurin 1993: 179).
Yet, at a collective level, a certain ‘moral universe has emerged in which the state is no
longer neutral in its dealing with its citizens’ (Talbot 2005: 163); a process which had a
deep impact on the youth’s political socialization. Indeed, official school textbooks and
the  medias  (public  and  private)52 played  an  important  role  in  disseminating  self-
expressionism  in  mainstream  politics  and  in  promoting  an  objectification  of  Islam
revolving around the central thematic of ‘Muslims in danger’.
87 The  corollary  ‘other’  of  this  dynamic  witnessed  important  changes  since  the  1980s.
Internally, the Shia minority (15-20% of the population) was progressively added to the
Ahmadi ‘unauthentic’ other.53 Externally, ‘the West’ joined the Indian/Hindu as the main
‘emotional  other  against  which  the  country  defined  itself’  (Metcalf  2004:  230)  when
Bhutto and Zia, for very pratical reasons, reframed Pakistan as a ‘Middle Eastern state’
linked to the ‘Muslim umma’ (an its rich funders). Nothing exemplifies this better than
the recent slogan cheerfully chanted by the young audience at the Indo-Pakistan Wagah
Border ceremony, ‘Allah superpower!’
88 If the youthfulness of the participants to the February 2006 protest is not surprising given
the country’s demographic trend,54 the picture is actually more complex. The Pakistani
youth’s  street  politics  is  characterized by a striking schism:  while the well-off  youth
mobilized against the November 2007 state of emergency for instance, it was conspicuous
by its absence in the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest that the middle-class youth, on the
contrary, enjoyed, and in a way, took over during the riot. This group of youngsters is,
indeed,  historically  much  more  receptive  to  self-expressionism,  which  give  ‘them  a
chance of not having to ‘get real’ in the restrictive sense that their parents and social
power holders demanded’ (Daechsel 2006: 35). The notion of ‘middle-class’ is certainly
problematic. It is understood here not in a meta-sociological sense or as conscience-based
group but as a ‘milieu’, a class of readers and consumers (Daechsel 2006: 10-15) and, also,
a group whose social mobility depends on education, emigration and, more than anything
else,  on ‘mastering the art  of  wheeling-dealing (…) learning to give and take bribes,
mobilizing  friends  and  relatives’  influence  (…)  to  access  to  governmental  authority’
(Qadeer 1983: 171). The anti-‘Danish cartoons’ demonstrators and rioters were all coming
from areas where, without mastering this ‘art’, no public services can be obtained.
89 The separation which existed in Lahore during colonial times between the European city
(The Mall and the Civil Lines) and the indigenenous cities (the Walled City and Model
Town) has been replaced by a division between a popular North and a westernized elitist
South55. The Mall, where the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest turned into a riot, operates, in
this  regard,  as  a  crucial  socio-physical  marker.  Significantly,  in  the  Southern  posh
districts, a grande peur type of rumour soon spread on the riot’s day (‘wheely boys and
bearded men are coming with sticks, shut down your shops and run!’). The Mall is also
one  of  the  rare  streets  where  the  elite’s  lifestyles  somehow  fuses  with  the  more
traditional ones characteristic of the Old City. With its Pizza Hut, Mac Do and foreign
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banks, yet conservative traders and shopkeepers, it is the place where the ‘cultural war’
so much feared by Farhan is fought. In a highly irritated tone, he told me:
These cartoons are part of a cultural war against Muslims. Do you really think that
these multinational companies are here just to make profit? No, their slogans are
not valueless: ‘Enjoy the dirt’ says the ad of Surf Excel or ‘if you feel like it, ask for
more’, that’s the Pepsi one I think. But no! You don’t just do what you feel like, and
you don’t enjoy getting dirty, in a Muslim society!
90 Self-expressionism, indeed, has a complex relationship with consumerism and its process
of  ‘demarcating  the  middle-class  body’  (Daechsel  2006:  94)  that  Western  companies’
advertisements  now foster.  As  the Rexona deodorant  ad’  recently  popularised in the
country, the youth is summoned to be either ‘cool’, if westernised and smelling good, or ‘
fazul’ (‘useless’), read unable to buy such a commodity (the ad’ also alludes, visually, to the
widespread  stereotype  regarding  the  ‘bad  smell’  of  the  ‘lower’  working  class).  At  a
symbolic  level,  the  14th February  riot  can  be  seen  as  a  revolt  against  this  imposed
demarcation:  riots  are  ‘inseparably  accompanied  by  the  personal  appropriation  and
incorporation of the ‘enemy’s status’ (Tambiah 1996: 215). Going to fast-foods, buying
western  cloth,  having  an  ATM  card  -  all  symbols  that  the  rioters  destroyed—were
precisely indicators of the new patterns of consumption that the city’s enriched middle-
class, who managed to pass on the other side of the divide, has experienced in the last
decade.
91 But the middle-class young rioters did more than destroying social boundaries on 14th
February  2006:  they also  asserted a  sense  of  agency.  They forced the  entry  of their
‘subaltern’ street culture into the public and political arena; a culture informed by peer
groups’  ‘programmes’,  street  fights,  playing police and thief  games,  doing motorbike
stunts ‘to frighten the bourgeois’ (as the French expression goes) and assert masculinity,
something  usually  done  in  the  posh  districts  at  night  and  all  over  the  city  on
Independence Day. This is attested not only by Waqas’ testimony but also by the very
presence in the crowd of many young men carrying organization’s flags and shouting,
going  up  and  down  on  their  motorbike  and  performing stunts.  Indeed,  as  much  as
patriotic  celebrations do,  the ‘cartoons’  protest,  as  it  revolved around the ‘Prophet’s
honour’, gave a legitimate opportunity to convey something else about oneself, not just
Muslim-ness, and of finding joy and pride in it.
92 Because anger ‘normally constitutes the prerogative of the powerful, social movements
have to re-appropriate the right to feel and display this particular emotions by their
members’  (Flam  2005:  19-20).  This  political  emotion  par  excellence is  a  ‘subversive
emotion’: in an aggressive but unmistaken manner, the ‘subaltern’ youth claimed its right
to be publicly angry, against the ‘outraging West’ and its ‘cultural war’, against the local
affluent and the police, and also against the political limbo it lives in. If the middle-class
youth is sensitive to the self-expressionist sirens’ songs, it is certainly not short of class-
based grievances: it just has no channels to voice them. As Farhan said about the rioters,
‘they were part of no system’.
93 This  is,  indeed,  a  urban  generation  who  is  much  less  politically  integrated  in  the
traditional  biraderi (kinship)  system  that  its  elders,  had  experienced  seven  years  of
military  rule,  violent  students  politics  and police’s  abuses,  who looks  at  voting  as  a
‘totally useless thing’ (as Waqas put it) and politics as ‘a corrupt business’, and who does
not participate in any citizens associations (usually led by the well-off  sectors of  the
society). All the young protestors I interviewed mentioned it: ‘the people’ had to react to
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the  ‘Danish  cartoons’  because  the  government  failed  to  protect  ‘the  Muslims’;  to
represent them, in other words.
94 After all, a street protest is not any kind of crowd:
Even when its objective is not clearly defined, it fights against decisions perceived
as  illegitimate  or  against  symbols  of  oppression  and  pretends  to  incarnate  the
popular will;  it can be playful or ferocious (…) but it is always oriented towards
finalities of power, truth, freedom or justice (Cefaï 2007: 74).
 
Conclusion
95 Social  protests,  and  even  riots,  are  events  which  insistute  a  public  arena:  actors
accomplish symbolic performances, enact emotions, claim moral preferences, reaffirm
collective identities,  and dramatize conflicts between distinct social groups. ‘Outraged
communities’, as shown by the February 2006 anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest in Lahore,
are  a  wonderful  case-study  to  reveal  these  often  disregarded  moral  and  emotional
dimensions of collective actions, except some extremely stimulating works (Jasper 1997,
Cefaï 2007, among others). This is particularly worth studying in the Pakistani context
wherein the public expression of emotions has become, with time, a matter of harsh
controversies  and  the  language  in  which  the  boundaries  between  rival  sects  are
commonly drawn (Blom forthcoming).
96 Although  ‘outraged  communities’  dream  themselves  as  eternal  communitas,  they  are
shaped in situ, on meaningful cause to fight for, in individual trajectories, at particular
locations,  informed  by  tensions  experienced  in  the  everyday  existence  and  local
imaginaires of outrage. They also appear at specific historical junctures: the accumulated
layers of state-sponsored ‘self-expressionism’, and particularly so in Punjab, proved very
functional  in emotionalizing and depoliticizing the restive middle-class,  as  well  as  in
safeguarding the military and PML rules.
97 Ibn-e Insha has vividly described this process in his satire of Pakistani math textbooks: I
am a Muslim; you are not a Muslim. This process is known as division by substraction. (…)
Ordinary people do not like the rules of substraction, because they get no sum total from
that which is taken away (Ibn-e Insha 2001: 100). The late and great Pakistani humourist
probably had in mind the horrors of the 1947 partition and the 1950s violence against the
Ahmadis. Fifty years later, ‘ordinary people’ still ‘do not get anything’ but do find the
ephemeral  and  destructive,  but  nonetheless  pleasurable,  feeling of  re-appropriating
politics in a familiar form, through the language of  religion,  emotion and pride that
makes it immediately meaningful.
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NOTES
1. I  am very grateful to Christophe Jaffrelot and Aminah Mohammad-Arif for their insightful
comments, to Khuram Iqbal for his invaluable help in conducing this research, and to the French
Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR) which sponsored this work as part of the programme
‘From Cultural Friction to Armed Conflict: A Turkey, Iran, Pakistan Comparison’. 
2. A clock is sold online with this inscription: ‘Question: What time is it, Rage boy? Answer: Time
to  die  infidel’  (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Kashmirs_Rage_Boy_invites_humour/
articleshow/2164387.cms)
3. In a public address on 19th September 2001, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008)
warned  that  ‘religious  leaders  inclined  towards  making  emotional  decisions  [should  not]  be
allowed to hold the sane majority as a hostage’ and stop it to side with the United States in the
‘war on terror’.
4. Sunni  Islam  is  divided  among  three  main  doctrinal  orientations  in  Pakistan  whose
interpretation of the sources of religious authority differs. The Ahl-i-Hadith reject the Hanafi fiqh
(followed by the two others), rely only on the Quran and hadith and claim to ‘purge’ Islam from
‘heterodox’ Sufi  practices.  Deobandis preach a self-consciously reformist faith centred on the
mosque and madrasa alone. Barelwis (naming themselves, as the ‘Ahl-i-Sunna wa Jamaat’,  lit.
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‘people  of  the  [prophetic]  way  and  the  [majority]  community’)  on  the  contrary  lay  special
emphasis on Sufi devotional practices and the intercessor power of the Prophet, the great saints
of the past and the living pir. Barelwi doctrine was established under the guidance of a Qadiri
preacher, Ahmed Riza Khan (1856-1921). On the history of this movement, see Sanyal (1996).
5. A  reformist  Islamic  sect  formed  in  1880s-90s,  in  Punjab,  by  Ghulam  Ahmad.  Though  his
position was quite ambiguous (equating his status with that of the Prophet but also stating to be
only a ‘reflector prophet’), his opponents accused him of contradicting Islam’s central tenet of
the finality of the prophecy. Ahmadis (0,5% of the Pakistani population according to—unreliable
—official figures) were declared a non-Muslim minority by the Pakistani government in 1974.
6. Brandishing a sword while two women stand behind him with only frightened eyes uncovered
(1); standing on a cloud to stop suicide bombers from getting into heaven because ‘our stock of
virgins  has  run out’  (2);  wearing a  turban with a  lighted bomb with a  face  looking like  the
stereotypical  villain (3).  The other drawings were less explicit  or understandable only in the
Danish context. 
7. Ahmed Abu Ladan, a Palestinan by birth close to the Egyptian Gamaat Islamiyya, who settled in
Denmark as a political refugee in 1984. On his biography and on the meaning of this ‘affair’ in the
Danish context, see Favret-Saada (2007).
8. Such  as  the  photograph  of  a  man  with  a  pig’s ears  and  snout,  presented as  a  ‘Western’
representation of the Prophet, but later identified as an old picture from a French ‘pig-squealing’
contest.
9. Naeemi’s biography is detailed in a separate section of this article.
10. All names have been changed, except for the organizer of the protest. Waqas’ biography is
also detailed below.
11. ‘This is the country not of Marx or Mao Ze Tong’s umma but of Muhammad’s umma, if we are
ready to fight for the sake of Allah’s religion, then with the help of Allah, we won’t be afraid to
open ten fronts’.
12. In  some popular pictures (especially  in Iran),  the Prophet can be portrayed with human
features  (Centlivres  2005).  In  Pakistan  the  norm  is  to  represent  him  through  his  symbolic
attributes alone.
13. This  Arabic  term also  means  ‘reputation,  esteem,  dignity’  and  comes  from the  word  ‘to
conceal (a secret)’. It clearly refers to what should be hidden (or not talked about) to preserve
one’s reputation. 
14. A local proverb.
15. On the usage of this rhetorical figure in social mobilization’s process, see Cefaï (2007: 505).
16. These eternally virgin and celestial female beings, mentioned in the Quran and promised to
the ‘good Muslims’, are obviously an allegory (Chebel 1995: 205). 
17. A Pakistani popular joke goes like this. Two friends die. The first one goes to heaven, the
other to hell. The first one is rooming around happily, a hoori in one arm and a bottle of whisky in
the other. The second friend, languishing in hell, shouts at him one day: ‘Hey, at least throw me
your bottle of whisky!’ But when he catches it and tries to drink it, he cries: ‘I cannot drink,
there’s no hole in this bottle!’ The first one replies, pointing at the hoori, ‘So what? She doesn’t
have one either!’ This joke clearly makes fun of those who practise Islam hoping for material
retribution alone.
18. This is how Ahmed Riza Khan (the founder of the Barelwi movement), at twenty years old,
replied when asked to introduce himself to his host (quoted in Metcalf 1982: 300).
19. His full title is: ‘Doctor’ maulana Muhammad Sarfaraz Naeemi ‘Azhari’. He got a PhD in Arabic
and Islamiyat from the Punjab University and graduated from al-Azhar University (Egypt). All the
following data are based on an interview with him (Lahore, may 2007) and on the prospectus of
the Dar-ul Ulum Jamaa Naeemia.
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20. He served, like his father, as a member of the state-controlled Council of Islamic Ideology for
a while.
21. Abu  Hasan  Ali  al-Hujwiri,  popularly  known as  Hazrat  Data  Ganj  Bakhsh  (‘the  giver  who
bestows treasure’) is a Sufi scholar from Ghazna said to have converted the first Hindu to Islam in
Lahore, where he died in 1077. His grave is the most popular site of Sufi veneration in the city.
22. To the extent that, in certain occasions, the motto ‘Ya Rasul’ (‘Oh Prophet!’) clearly indicates
a person’s sympathy for the Barelwi tradition.
23. The centre of the agitation was also located in the Wazir Khan’s Barelwi mosque (Ahmad
1993: 12).
24. Although this time the IJT triggered the protest, the resolution stipulating that Ahmadis were
a non-Muslim minority, which was subsequently changed into a constitutional amendment, was
initially  presented in  the  National  Assembly  by  a  Barelwi  alim and JUP leader  (Shah Ahmed
Noorani).
25. The JuD (named as such in December 2001 but formerly known as the Markaz Dawa wal-
Irshad or by the name of its armed wing, the Lashkar-i-Tayyeba) was formed in 1986 to send
Pakistani Ahl-i-Hadith recruits to fight (in marginal number) in Afghanistan and, after 1990, in
Indian Kashmir. 
26. Despite  the  growing presence of  Deobandi  and Ahl-i-Hadith  madrasas,  Lahore  remains  a
Barelwi  stronghold.  Out  of  the  356  registered  madrasas  located  in  the  city  in  2002  (30,  000
students), 149 are Barelwi with about 20, 000 students (Shahzad 2002). 
27. See the conservative Urdu newspaper Nawa-e-Waqt’s coverage on 16th February 2006.
28. Attacking churches is a more common repertoire in the rural periphery of Lahore (such as
during the ‘Danish cartoons’ controversy, when a mob attacked a Christian school and church in
Kasur). In Lahore, discrimination and false accusations of ‘blasphemy’ are more widespread.
29. Shahrukh Khan is an Indian (Muslim) actor extremely popular in Pakistan and famous for his
fits of anger.
30. A colloquial expression (chhatis ka akra), meaning to pick up a fight, used in the Bollywood
movies’ slang reapropriated by Old City’s youngster.
31. Commonly used by Shias, but sometimes by Sunnis as well (also a typical expression used by
the Muslim hero, or villain, in popular movies).
32. An uneasiness increased, of course, by the fact that the interviewer was a woman.
33. Being bribed by the police is a very common experience for young middle-class Lahoris using
motorbikes.  It  reached  such  proportion  and  public  anger  that  the  Punjab  Government  was
recently compelled to replace the entire force by a new ‘traffic police’,  graduated and highly
paid.
34. 73% of the Barelwi madrasas’ graduates are coming from Punjab (Malik 1996: 244).
35. In 1978 for instance, the Awqaf Department forbade its employees to say durud (request for
mercy upon the Prophet and praise) before the azan (call for prayer), a decision Barelwi ulama 
eventually fought in court.
36. The ban, enforced in 1984, was lifted in March 2008 only. 
37. When the Muslim Students Federation (PLM)-IJT (JI) alliance broke in the early 1990s, for
instance, the two unions started jostling with each for campus influence (IJT won in Islamiya
College while the MSF dominated MAO College, to be replaced in 2000, and after a fierce struggle,
by  the  splinter  pro-Musharraf  MSF-Q).  In 1984-2004,  165  students  were  killed  in  525  violent
incidents in Lahore, against 13 students in 151 incidents in 1947-1984 (Khan 2008).
38. Literaly ‘witticism’ or ‘joke’, jugat is a favourite pastime in Lahore, almost an art that one
masters,  wherein  members  of  male  peer  groups  throw  humiliating,  yet  highly  imaginative,
insults at each other to test the other’s resistance.
39. For details on this issue, see Ahmed (2004: 102-103).
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40. Given the lack of academic work, this chronology is tentative. I am very grateful to Professor
Tahir Kamran (GCU, Lahore) and to Shohaib Hashmi for helping me with this.
41. After  the  Sikhs  were  granted  control  by  the  colonial  authorities  (and  demolished  the
remnants of the mosque), 2000 people massed at the entrance of Landa Bazaar and put the police
station under siege. 12 of them died. Barelwi ulama issued fatwas stating that those who had not
joined the agitation could not received Islamic funerals. See Gilmartin (1988: 99-107).
42. But a much bloodier one as 300 people died (Government of Punjab 1954: 35).
43. Factional infightings within the PML, for instance, also played a crucial role during the 1953
riots.
44. Both concepts  were coined to  describe  the activism of  the American anti-alcohol  league
fighting to embody the ‘good americanity’. See Gusfield (1986).
45. In Lahore, its first manifestations into the public arena were precisely the Shahidganj issue
and the anti-Ahmadis disturbances.
46. With the brief exception of the 2007 lawyers movement which, nonetheless, failed to mobilize
outside its professional ranks.
47. Blasphemy is defined in Pakistan’s Penal Code (a slightly revised version of the 1860 colonial
code) as ‘injuring or defiling place of worship, with intent to insult the religion of any class of
persons’ (art. 295) and ‘the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person’
by ‘word’, ‘sound’ or ‘gesture’ or any ‘object in the sight of that person’ (art. 298).
48. This  article  states  that  ‘whoever  by  words,  either  spoken  or  written,  or  by  visible
representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the
sacred  name  of  the  Holy  prophet  Muhammad  (PBUH)  shall  be  punished  with  death,  or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine’.
49. On fire as a ‘pure event’, an impersonal or agency-less force of destruction, see Thomas Blom
Hansen’s article in this volume. 
50. Lahore was, at the time of the anti-‘Danish cartoons’ protest, a quasi-monopoly of the two
PML factions.
51. The mention of religion in the Passport basically targeted the Ahmadis to prevent them of
going on pilgrimage in Mecca. In 1992, Nawaz Sharif decided that the National Identity Card
should  also  mention  its  holder’s  religion  (a  decision  cancelled  after  protests  from  the  civil
society). In 2005, the Punjabi hard-core component of the PML-Q mobilized against Musharraf’s
decision to remove the ‘religious column’ from the new machine-readable passports. The column
was restored.
52. On the private channel GEO TV for instance, the anchor of the religious program Alim Online
(a  former  Federal  minister  for  Religious  affairs)  declared  in  September  2008  the  murder  of
Ahmadis  to  be  compulsory.  Two days  later,  two  Ahmadis  (a  doctor  and  a  rice  trader)  were
assassinated in Punjab and Sindh.
53. See on this Nosheen Ali’s article in this volume.
54. The 18-30 years old are one-quarter of the country’s population. In Lahore alone, the 15-25
years old male population is about 20%.
55. This has to be slightly nuanced: Lahore’s neighborhoods do not constitute spatial monopolies
(with the major exception of Defence, a newly developed area on army lands) and there are some
popular disticts in the South as well.
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ABSTRACTS
How can a long-distance outrage provoke social protest, even riots? The street demonstration
against the ‘Danish cartoons’ that took place in Lahore on 14th February 2006 was primarily an
expressive protest, publicly voicing its anger and moral discontent. As such, it offers a fruitful
micropolitical  site to understand how emotions contribute to shape the culture of dissent in
contemporary Pakistan. Based on interviews with protestors, this article elaborates, first, on the
linkages  between  anger,  honour,  the  cognitively  framed  belief  of  being  ‘provoked’,  and
biographical emotional repertoires. Second, it looks at the conflicting emotions displayed in the
public arena: a desire of communitas yet destruction, an expression of compulsory feeling but
subversive emotions as well. Finally, it argues that this protest has to be replaced in the larger
framework of the state’s singular politics of emotion that informs public debates in Pakistan, and
particularly  so  in  Punjab.  Hence,  the  article  focuses  on  a  dimension  often  neglected  in  the
literature on emotions and social movements: the emotional-institutional context.
INDEX
Keywords: outrage, social movements, riot, emotions, moral values, Barelwi, youth, Lahore,
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